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Abstract 
We study information processing in a simple endowment economy 
where the mean consumption growth rate are governed by a hidden 
state variable and agents have recursive preferences. We show that 
for typical parameter values, there is a strong incentive to commit 
to ignoring future information on the state of the economy, but that 
such commitment raises time-inconsistency problems. We estimate 
the model on postwar US data and find that the representative consumer 
can achieve a utility gain equivalent to a 20% increase in lifetime 
consumption simply by not paying attention to the state of the 
economy. 
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1 Introduction
Information on the state of the economy can be valuable for two reasons.
First, it can be used to make informed choices between diﬀerent actions.
Second, information alleviates uncertainty about future consumption.
We are interested in the second eﬀect, so we isolate it by studying an
endowment economy where agents have Epstein-Zin’s preferences (See Kreps
and Porteus, 1978; Epstein and Zin, 1989; Weil, 1989). The main framework
is a standard one. Agents know the structure of the economy and observe
consumption growth rates, but not the underlying time varying trend. What
is new is that we let agents choose whether to use ﬁltering algorithms to
estimate the underlying hidden trend. The most intuitive example would
be the case when processing the available informations entails some small
mental costs. Instead of processing the information and incure the cost, the
agent can choose to remain with his prior beliefs about the hidden state of
the economy.
Our results are very diﬀerent from what obtains when consumers always
process all available information. In this case, a consumer has a preference
for early resolution of uncertainty whenever his relative risk aversion is higher
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ence Foundation.
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(a) ≻ (b) ⇐⇒ EIS > 1/CRRA
(a) ≺ (b) ⇐⇒ EIS < 1/CRRA
than the inverse of his elasticity of intertemporal substitution.1 What this
means is illustrated in Figure 1 which is taken from Kocherlakota (1990).
Given a choice, an agent with a preference for early resolution of uncertainty
would prefer tree (a) to tree (b): the two trees oﬀer the same distribution
of outcomes at each point in time, but in tree (a), time 2 consumption is
revealed one period earlier.
A priori, one might think that a consumer who has a preference for early
resolution of uncertainty under perfect information processing has no incen-
tive to ignore information on the current state of the economy. Knowledge
about the state of the economy reduces uncertainty about future consumption
and would be welcome as such. However, if there is a persistent component
to consumption growth rates, there is an eﬀect that goes in the opposite
direction. Agents with relatively high risk aversion also dislike a positive
correlation between current consumption growth and expected consumption
growth. By not updating their expectations about future growth rates they
suﬀer from more consumption uncertainty, which lowers their utility, but also
shut down any correlation between consumption realizations and expected
future realizations. In the simple economy we study, the second eﬀect typi-
cally dominates, so ignorant agents have a higher utility level.
1See e.g. Kocherlakota (1990) or Skiadas (1998).
2We also show that there is a tension between consumers’ desire to re-
duce uncertainty and their desire to shut down correlation between realized
and expected future consumption growth rates. This tension generates time
consistency issues. The optimal strategy for a consumer is to learn the cur-
rent state of the economy but commit to never updating his beliefs in the
future. Learning the current consumption level reduces uncertainty while
leaving future correlations unchanged; committing to never updating beliefs
in the future shuts down the correlation. However, in future periods, the
optimal strategy will look the same. So, unless consumers can commit, they
will always choose to update their beliefs.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the model and our
two laboratory economies. Section 3 establishes the utility gains or losses
that an agent would face from learning the state of the economy. Section 4
provides an overview on the model’s estimation and discusses the results for
the two diﬀerent economies, and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We base our model of the economy on the canonical one in Hansen et al.
(2005).
2.1 Preferences




1−ρ + βRt (Vt+1)
1−ρ¤ 1
1−ρ (1)
where ρ is equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution. The risk adjustment Rt is also speciﬁed as a CES:






where θ is the Coeﬃcient of Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) and Ft is
the period t information set. Vt is obviously homogeneous of degree 1 in the
level of consumption. Let vt denote the logarithm of the continuation value









logEt [exp((1 − θ)vt+1)]
2.2 Stochastic Processes
Our laboratory is a simple endowment economy where the growth rate of
the log of the representative agent’s consumption is the sum of an AR(1)
component and a white noise shock.
Let ǫt and νt be two series of i.i.d. standard normal innovation terms.
Log consumption follows a random walk plus a time varying drift and its
ﬁrst diﬀerence is given by
ct+1 − ct =  c + xt+1 + σcǫt+1. (4)
The expected log consumption growth rate at time t is a combination of
a constant ( c) and a time varying component xt. xt follows an AR(1):
xt+1 = κxt + σxνt+1 (5)
2.3 Alternative information sets
We focus on three speciﬁcations for the information set Ft. In all spec-
iﬁcations, consumers know their current consumption level as well as the
stochastic processes governing the evolution of the endowment stream. In
the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, consumers neither observe xt nor try to infer its value
from past consumption growth rates. The rationale for not trying to estimate
the current state of the economy might either be that information processing
is costly or, as we will show, that it reduces utility and that consumers can
constrain themselves from estimating xt. We will refer to this speciﬁcation
as the no ﬁltering economy. In the second case, which we will refer to as ob-
servable economy (I), the consumers also know the current value of the state
variable xt. As a third state we let the consumers have even more information
and let them directly observe xt+1. This is equivalent to letting the mean
consumption growth rate for t+1 be given by ( c+xt) instead of ( c+xt+1).
We refer to this speciﬁcation as observable economy (II). Summarizing:
1. no ﬁltering: Ft = {Ct, c,σc,σx,κ}
42. observable economy (I): Ft = {Ct, c,σc,σx,κ,xt}
3. observable economy (II): Ft = {Ct, c,σc,σx,κ,xt+1}
2.4 Value functions for ρ = 1
As in Tallarini (2000) we focus on the case ρ = 1. In conjunction with
the Gaussian shock processes we assume, it allows for simple closed form
solutions for the value function under the three information sets. The ρ = 1




logE (exp[(1 − θ)(vt+1 + ct+1 − ct)] | Ft) (6)
2.4.1 No ﬁltering
We ﬁrst look at the case when the consumers do not observe x and do not
use historical consumption growth rates to infer its current value. In this
case, the only variable in the consumers information set which changes over
time is the current consumption level Ct. It follows that vt is constant. We




logE [exp[(1 − θ)(˜ v + ct+1 − ct]]
=
β
(1 − β)(1 − θ)
logE [exp[(1 − θ)(ct+1 − ct]]
Unconditionally, ∆ct+1 ∼ N ( c,σ2
c + σ2


















The second term in the squared parenthesis of equation (7) is a risk adjust-
ment. Its magnitude depends on the sum of the variance of the white noise
consumption shock and the unconditional variance of the trend consumption
growth rate. The risk adjustment lowers utility whenever the coeﬃcient of
risk aversion θ is larger than 1.
2Equation (18) of Hansen et al. (2005)
52.4.2 Observable economy (I)
We denote vt in the the case where the consumers observe xt but not xt+1
by vI
t. The solution for vI
t is given by
v
I































Notice that  I
v is the unconditional expectation of vI
t, because the mean
of xt is 0. A change with respect to the no ﬁltering case is that, while ˜ v
depends on the unconditional variance of the trend growth rate,  I
v depends
on the discounted long run impact of a shock to next period’s trend growth
rate.
2.4.3 Observable economy (II)
We denote vt in the the case where the consumers know xt+1 by vII
t . The
solution for vII
t is given by
v
II































The normalized value function for economy (II) looks very much like the
one for economy (I). The coeﬃcient on the observed state of the economy is
1/κ higher, because the observed state in this economy is the actual growth
rate for next period and not that of the current one. An innovation to the
trend growth rate will ﬁrst have an eﬀect two periods in the future instead of
next period. As a result its risk adjustment is multiplied with the discount
factor β.
63 Utility eﬀect of learning the state of the
economy
Having established expressions for the value functions under diﬀerent infor-
mation assumptions, we can now proceed to the core of the paper: establish-
ing the utility gain from learning the state of the economy. We compute the
expected gain by taking the diﬀerence between the unconditional expectation
of vt with full information and ˜ v. In the observable economy (I) case, the
diﬀerence is given by
E[v
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In the observable economy (II) case, it is given by
E[v
II














The sign of the diﬀerence depends on the sign of the diﬀerence inside the
large parenthesis as well as on the risk aversion parameter θ. We are par-
ticularily interested in the case when the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
θ is larger than the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. If
θ > 1, then we need the diﬀerence within the large parentheses to be negative
to generate a positive utility gain from knowing the state of the economy. In
both economies, this requires the discounted future impact of innovations to
the underlying growth state to be larger than the unconditional variance of
the mean growth rate. In the full information economy (I), this holds when
κ
2β
2 − 2κβ + κ
2 > 0.
When β is in the neighborhood of 1, this will never be true as long as x
is stationary and κ > 0. How low β has to be in order for the inequality to
hold depends on the size of κ. As the process for x becomes less persistent,
we need a very high discount factor to make the inequality hold. This is
illustrated in the left hand side panel of ﬁgure 2. The shaded area gives
combinations of β and κ where expected utility is lower when xt ∈ Ft.
As discussed above, innovations to the trend growth rate in economy (II)
will ﬁrst have an impact two periods ahead, which makes the discounted
aggregate impact of such innovations smaller. For this economy, the large
parenthesis has a negative sign whenever
7Figure 2: Parameter regions where information lowers utility when θ > 1
The shaded areas in both panels give parameter values for which
there is a utility loss from always learning the state of the economy





































































2 − 1) − 2κβ + 1 > 0.
As conﬁrmed by the right hand side panel of Figure 2, this is less stringent
than in the observable economy (I). But also this condition will typically be
violated when consumption growth rates are positively correlated and the
time discount factor is close to one.
3.1 The time inconsistency problem
In the last section we saw that typically consumers’ utility is higher when they
constrain themselves from updating their state beliefs. In this section, we
show that implementing such constraints raises time inconsistency issues: in
each period the optimal strategy is to learn the current state of the economy
and commit to never update the state beliefs.
Consider a consumer who has no information on the current state of the
economy beyond the current consumption level. We let ˆ vt(n) denote the
normalized utility level of an agent who learned the current state of the
8economy n periods ago and credibly committed to never update his beliefs






























































The temptation the consumer faces is that, by updating his beliefs, he
achieves an expected utility increase of
T













in economy (I) and
T













in economy (II). For θ > 1 there is always a positive temptation to update
information and this temptation increases as n increases. However, as we will
see in the next section, the temptation remains quantitatively modest even
for T(∞).
4 Application to the US data
4.1 Data and Estimation
To quantify the eﬀects we documented above, we estimate the state space
system for consumption growth on the US postwar data. Our data-set con-
9sists of quarterly data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1952 to the third quarter
of 2006. The series used are taken from the NIPA tables published on the
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ website (http://bea.gov/). We use the con-
sumption of services and non-durables (NDS) as our consumption measure.
Since a NDS series is not available from BEA we constructed it from the
series of durables and personal consumption expenditures. In doing so, care
was taken to avoid the problems related to the addition of chain-weighted
series by using the Tornqvist formula (see Whelan, 2002).
We use Gibbs sampling to estimate the relevant parameters of Equations
(4) and (5). The consumption growth process is the observation equation
and the AR(1) process for x is the state equation.
First, we jointly estimate the four process parameters using an informative
prior on the volatility of the hidden state and an uninformative one on the
persistence (κ). In particular, following Hansen (2007) closely, the prior on
σ2
x is an inverse gamma with shape parameter 10 and scale parameter 2.209×
10−06, which implies a mode of 0.00047 for σx. The prior for κ is normal,
conditional on σx, with mean 0 and standard deviation σx × 1.41 × 106. We
use rejection sampling to truncate the support of κ to [−1 1] (see Gelfand
et al. (1992)).
To see the predictions of our model over a larger set of parameter values
for the crucial parameter κ, we repeat the estimation procedure ﬁxing it
to diﬀerent levels and keeping the same prior on σx. The means and the
standard deviations of the estimates, reported in Table 1, are obtained with
50,000 draws, after discarding the ﬁrst 5,000 draws.
The unconditional estimation, reported in the shaded rows in Table 1,
shows a relatively high persistence of the hidden state of the economy, with
κ equal to 0.81. This feature is conﬁrmed by Figure 3, where the posterior
distribution of the κ estimates is plotted along with the given prior. It is
also worth noting that, by performing the estimation for given values of κ,
the σx estimates are not to be greatly aﬀected. This is probably due to the
rather informative prior we have chosen (cf. Figure 4).
In Figure 5 we plot the smoothed estimates of the hidden state of the
economy, for three diﬀerent values of κ: from a very low level of persistence
(0.2) to the extreme persistent case (0.979). The gray areas point out the
oﬃcial NBER recession periods. The estimates with higher levels of κ are
smoother and the ﬂuctuations are of larger magnitude.
10Table 1: Estimated process parameters
Reported are the estimated parameters for the US postwar data (Q1:1952–
Q3:2006; source: BEA). Estimation is performed with 50,000 draws from
a Gibbs sampler, discarding the ﬁrst 5,000. The shaded rows shows the
results from the unconditional estimation where the prior on σ2
x is an inverse
gamma with shape parameter 10 and scale parameter 2.209 × 10−06, which
implies a mode of 0.00047 for σx. The prior for the persistence parameter is
normal, conditional on σx, with mean 0 and standard deviation σx×1.41×106
truncated with support [−1 1]. The other rows show the estimates for ﬁxed
values of κ and the same priors for the other parameters.
κ σx  c σc
0.20000 0.00051 0.00509 0.00474
— (0.00009) (0.00032) (0.00023)
0.70000 0.00059 0.00508 0.00462
— (0.00015) (0.00034) (0.00025)
0.81060 0.00060 0.00513 0.00451
(0.24706) (0.00014) (0.00091) (0.00026)
0.95000 0.00057 0.00506 0.00447
— (0.00011) (0.00078) (0.00024)
0.97900 0.00054 0.00500 0.00448
— (0.00010) (0.00153) (0.00024)
4.2 Quantitative Results
Table 2 reports the utility gains (or losses) for a consumer facing the informa-
tion sets in the two studied economies with respect to the case when they do
not observe the hidden state and they do not use the historical consumption
growth rates to infer it. In particular, Panel A line 1, reports the amount of
consumption an agent would require to be indiﬀerent between learning the
current state with certainty and not processing the available information.
Lines 2 and 3 report the same measure from learning only once the hidden
state, and from committing not to process the available future information
(knowing the current state). The same gains are reported for the economy
11Figure 3: Prior and posterior probabilities of the persistence coeﬃcient (κ)
Reported are the prior (dashed line) and the posterior (solid line) dis-
tributions of the κ estimate. The prior is normal conditional on σx with
mean 0 and standard deviation σx × 1.41 × 106 truncated with support
[−1 1]. The posterior is obtained with 50,000 draws from a Gibbs
sampler, discarding the ﬁrst 5,000.









(II) case in Panel B. All numbers are reported for a quarterly time discount
factor (β) of 0.9925, with a CRRA of 10 and are given in percentage points.
The results highlight the crucial role of the persistence parameter κ in
determining the value of knowing the state of the economy. If the state
of the economy is very persistent, knowing the current state will reveal a
lot about future economic conditions. When the persistence parameter is
low, the results show that there are no signiﬁcant utility gains to be made
from processing available information in both the experimental economies (cf.
Table 2, column 2). As the persistence parameter increases, the numbers
become sizable. Always learning the state of the economy corresponds to
almost a 20% drop in lifetime consumption when κ = 0.979. The results
for the very high persistence parameter are particularly interesting, because
the long run risk literature has shown that we need such a high level of κ to
explain the equity premium. (See e.g. Bansal and Yaron, 2004.)
Having established that there might be large gains to be made from ig-
noring information on the state of the world, we now want to check whether
12Figure 4: Prior and posterior probabilities of the variance of the hidden state
(σx)
This ﬁgure reports the prior (dashed line) and the posterior (solid
lines) distributions of the σx estimates, where the posteriors are
obtained obtained with 50,000 draws from a Gibbs sampler, dis-
carding the ﬁrst 5,000. Each line correspond to another ﬁxed level
of κ from {0.2,0.7,0.811,0.95,0.979}












or not the time inconsistency issues discussed in section 3.1 might prevent
us from achieving them. As we see from lines 2 and 5, the theoretical time
inconsistency issues documented above is negligible. Even for the highest
persistence level considered, it amounts to only 0.062% when measured in
terms of an equivalent increase in consumption. Even a minor information
processing cost would hence suﬃce to make committing to not processing in-
formation time consistent. Lines 3 and 6 of the table conﬁrm that committing
to not processing information yields a high and positive utility gain.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the role of information processing in a
simple endowment economy where the agents have Epstein-Zin’s preferences.
13Figure 5:
Plotted are the smoothed estimates of the hidden state x for dif-
ferent values of the persistence parameter. The gray areas indicate
oﬃcial NBER recession periods.































14Table 2: Utility gains
Reported are the estimated utility gains (or losses) by agents in the
two analyzed experimental economies. Numbers are reported for a
quarterly time discount factor (β) of 0.9925 and a CRRA parameter
of 10. Numbers are in percentage points. Panel A reports the ﬁgures
for the economy (I) while Panel B reports the ﬁgures for the economy
(II).
κ 0.200 0.700 0.811 0.950 0.979
σx 0.00051 0.00059 0.00060 0.00057 0.00054
Panel A: Economy I
E[vt] − ˜ v -0.008 -0.180 -0.495 -5.540 -19.277
E[ˆ vt(0) − ˜ v] 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.062
ˆ vt(0) − vt 0.008 0.180 0.498 5.878 23.958
Panel A: Economy II
E[vt] − ˜ v -0.008 -0.178 -0.491 -5.498 -19.145
E[ˆ vt(0) − ˜ v] 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.065
ˆ vt(0) − vt 0.008 0.177 0.490 5.785 23.554
The maintained assumption is that agents do not directly observe the growth
state of the endowment good but know the parameters of the process that
governs it.
Within this framework, we have documented a time inconsistency prob-
lem: The same parameter constellation that makes an agent prefer to have
consumption uncertainty resolved today rather than in the future also gives
him an incentive to commit to not processing information on the state of the
economy in future periods.
We provide analytical expressions for both the gains from processing in-
formation today and for committing to not processing information in the
future. We show that the gains that can be achieved from committing to
not processing information in the future far outweigh the gains that can be
achieved by reneging on the commitment. A small information processing
cost would be suﬃcient to make the commitment time consistent.
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